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STANDING ON THE WRONG SIDE: HERNANDEZ v. 
MESA AND BIVENS REMEDIES IN THE CONTEXT 
OF CROSS-BORDER SHOOTINGS BY FEDERAL 
LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Abstract: Bivens claims provide individual plaintiffs the ability to seek civil 
remedies for violations of their constitutional rights by federal actors. In March 
of 2018, the Fifth Circuit held, in Hernandez v. Mesa, that a Bivens remedy was 
unavailable where a Border Patrol officer standing in the United States shot and 
killed a Mexican citizen on the other side of the border. In August of 2018, with 
nearly identical facts, the Ninth Circuit, in Rodriguez v. Swartz, split from the 
Fifth Circuit by holding that a Bivens remedy was indeed available for an extra-
territorial shooting. This Comment acknowledges that the Fifth Circuit’s denial 
of a Bivens remedy is consistent with the framework announced by the Supreme 
Court in 2017 in Ziglar v. Abbasi and will most likely be upheld. This Comment 
argues, however, that leaving victims of extraterritorial shootings without a cause 
of action is deeply problematic. Congress should act to provide a remedy for 
constitutional violations perpetrated by federal law enforcement at international 
boundaries, regardless of extraterritoriality. 
PREFACE 
As this Comment went to press, the Supreme Court released its Hernan-
dez v. Mesa opinion declining to extend a Bivens remedy to a cross-border 
shooting.1 The Court confirmed that the proper approach to extending Bivens 
is to determine (1) if the claim represents a new context and (2) whether any 
special factors counsel hesitation in extending the remedy.2 The Court held that 
an extraterritorial shooting by a United States Border Patrol agent represents a 
new context in which there are several special factors that counsel hesitation 
by the Court.3 Those factors include the foreign relations and national security 
issues inherently raised by a shooting at the border, as well as the absence of a 
remedy created by Congress.4 The Court recognized that, most importantly, 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Hernandez v. Mesa, No. 17-1678, 2020 WL 889193, at *3 (S. Ct. Feb. 25, 2020); see infra notes 
9–10 (defining a Bivens remedy). 
 2 Id. at *5–6. 
 3 Id. at *6–7. 
 4 Id. at *11. The Court emphasized a border shooting is inherently an “international incident,” and 
that issues implicating foreign relations are best left within the purview of the executive and legisla-
tive branches of government. Id. at *7. Moreover, the Court noted the “clear and strong connection” 
between border security and national security. Id. at *9. Additionally, the Court emphasized that Con-
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these factors all relate to the central separation of powers inquiry in Bivens—
whether it is better for the legislative or judicial branch to establish a remedy.5 
The Court held that a decision to extend a remedy to a cross-border shooting 
by a federal official should “undoubtedly” be left to Congress.6 This Comment 
provides a historical overview of the Bivens remedy, discusses the recent cir-
cuit split on the issue, predicts the Court’s holding in Hernandez v. Mesa, and 
argues that Congress should act to provide a suitable remedy for victims of 
cross-border shootings perpetrated by federal law enforcement. 
INTRODUCTION 
Causes of action against government officials for violations of constitu-
tional rights have a storied past in American legal history.7 In 1871, concerned 
with civil rights abuses in the former Confederate states, Congress enacted 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 to create a cause of action allowing individuals whose constitu-
tional rights are violated by state or local officials to seek damages.8 One hun-
dred years later, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bu-
reau of Narcotics, the Supreme Court inferred a similar cause of action for vio-
lations of an individual’s constitutional rights by a federal actor.9 Known as 
Bivens claims or Bivens remedies, this implied cause of action provides an in-
dividual plaintiff the opportunity to seek civil redress under the limited set of 
circumstances recognized by the Court.10 
                                                                                                                           
gress has declined to create a damages remedy for claims arising from an extraterritorial incident. Id. 
at *9. 
 5 Id. *11–12. 
 6 Id. at *12. 
 7 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Bidding Farewell to Constitutional Torts, 107 CALIF. L. 
REV. 933, 941–51 (2019) (describing the historical background of causes of action for violations of 
constitutional rights). A cause of action allows an injured person to seek a remedy in court against a 
person accused of the wrongdoing which produced the injury. Cause of Action, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 8 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) (providing a cause of action against state and local officials, but 
not federal officials, for constitutional violations); Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 742 (9th Cir. 
2018) (discussing the Civil War origins of causes of actions for constitutional violations, and Con-
gress’s intent to use the federal courts to protect citizens from the states). Congress enacted the 1871 
statute in which § 1983 originated during Reconstruction in what was known at the time as the Ku 
Klux Klan Act. Fallon, supra note 7, at 946. 
 9 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 
(1971) (recognizing an implied cause of action against federal law enforcement officials who violated 
an individual’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure). In this case, the 
petitioner brought suit against law enforcement officials who entered his home without a warrant, 
arrested him, and ultimately subjected him to a strip search. Id. at 389. Taken together with § 1983 
claims, these causes of action are sometimes known as “constitutional torts.” See Fallon, supra note 7, 
at 947. 
 10 See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1854–55 (2017) (noting that the Court has only extended 
a Bivens remedy for unreasonable search and seizures, sex-based employment discrimination, and 
inadequate medical care of a prisoner). When a constitutional right is violated by a federal employee, 
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Since 2010, an estimated one hundred people have died after coming into 
contact with United States Border Patrol agents.11 Two cases involving a dead-
ly, cross-border shooting by a Border Patrol agent, Hernandez v. Mesa and Ro-
driguez v. Swartz, have worked their way through the federal court system as 
the victims’ families have raised Bivens claims against the individual federal 
agents involved.12 Because criminal prosecution of an individual Border Patrol 
agent is unlikely to proceed, a civil remedy may be the only remaining re-
                                                                                                                           
a cause of action may be “implied” by the Court where neither a federal statute, nor the Constitution 
itself, explicitly provides for such a claim. Id. at 1855. Before Bivens was decided, the Court would 
imply a cause of action to fulfill a statute’s intent even where the statute did not expressly provide for 
one. Id. This judicial practice led to the extension of an implied cause of action for a constitutional viola-
tion where a remedy was not explicitly contemplated or otherwise available. Id. In his famous concur-
rence in Bivens, Justice John Marshall Harlan opined that for a petitioner like Mr. Bivens, where the 
federal government cannot be sued directly and injunctive relief is unavailing because the violation has 
already occurred, “it is damages or nothing.” Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 11 Deaths by Border Patrol, SBCC (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.southernborder.org/deaths_by_
border_patrol [https://perma.cc/E52M-2XPZ]. Southern Border Communities Coalition (SBCC) bases 
its estimates on deaths connected to Border Patrol agents on official agency communications from the 
United States Customs and Border Protection, as well as local press coverage. Id. SBCC is an advoca-
cy group made up of over sixty community organizations along the United States southwestern bor-
der. About Southern Border Communities Coalition, SBCC, https://www.southernborder.org/about 
[https://perma.cc/6NGM-7LR5]. The Border Patrol was founded in 1924 to secure the nation’s bor-
ders and enforce its immigration laws. Border Patrol History, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTEC-
TION, https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/history [https://perma.cc/Q2PG-4DG2]. 
With nearly 20,000 Border Patrol agents, it is the largest federal law enforcement agency in the na-
tion. Roxana Altholz, Elusive Justice: Legal Redress for Killings by U.S. Border Agents, 27 BERKE-
LEY LA RAZA L.J. 1, 3 (2017); U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, SNAPSHOT: A SUMMARY OF 
CBP FACTS AND FIGURES (2019), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2019-
Aug/CBP_Snapshot_07032019.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JL3-59V5]. Human rights advocates argue that 
this behemoth of an agency operates with dangerously insufficient oversight and accountability, par-
ticularly within the context of the anti-immigrant attitudes espoused by the Trump administration. 
Megan Specia & Rick Gladstone, Border Agents Shot Tear Gas into Mexico. Was It Legal?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/28/world/americas/tear-gas-border.html 
[https://perma.cc/WNT2-88FJ]; see, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017) 
(severely restricting the ability of refugees to resettle in the United States by suspending the U.S. 
Refugee Admissions Program for 120 days and restricting the total number of refugees allowed into 
the country); Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 25, 2017) (restricting federal funding 
available to “sanctuary cities,” which are those jurisdictions that limited their cooperation with U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement); Eugene Scott, Trump’s Most Insulting—and Violent—
Language Is Often Reserved for Immigrants, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.washington
post.com/politics/2019/10/02/trumps-most-insulting-violent-language-is-often-reserved-immigrants/ 
[https://perma.cc/PU6B-EFU2] (describing President Trump’s vitriolic language toward immigrants, 
including an infamous statement made during his 2015 presidential candidacy announcement in which 
he proclaimed, “[w]hen Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best . . . . They’re sending 
people that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing 
drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists.”). 
 12 Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811, 814 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. granted in part, 139 S. Ct. 2636 
(2019); Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 726; see infra notes 58–71 and accompanying text (describing the facts 
and procedural histories of Hernandez v. Mesa and Rodriguez v. Swartz). 
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course.13 The twin tragedies of these cases—two teenage boys shot and killed 
by Border Patrol agents—cannot be understated.14 
Hernandez and Rodriguez have resulted in a circuit split that raises serious 
policy concerns related to the ability to recover damages against a federal official 
for a cross-border shooting in some jurisdictions along the southern border, but 
not in others.15 In 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Her-
nandez, declined to extend a Bivens remedy to a victim’s family after a Border 
Patrol agent in the United States shot across the international boundary and 
killed a Mexican citizen.16 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
however, in Rodriguez, made a Bivens remedy available under those exact cir-
cumstances.17 The Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari in 
Hernandez and heard arguments in November 2019.18 
Part I of this Comment gives an overview of the doctrinal framework of 
the Bivens remedy, the relevant facts and procedural history of Hernandez and 
Rodriguez, and the resulting circuit split on the issue.19 Part II analyzes the 
different approaches taken by the circuit courts when extending a Bivens rem-
edy to a new context.20 Finally, Part III explains that the Fifth Circuit properly 
applied the Supreme Court’s recent Bivens jurisprudence, and the court’s deci-
sion in Hernandez will likely be upheld.21 Part III additionally argues, howev-
er, that declining to extend a cause of action for cross-border shootings perpe-
                                                                                                                           
 13 See Altholz, supra note 11, at 16 (explaining that prosecution of Border Patrol agents in cases 
where lethal force is used is extremely rare). State prosecutors have only brought charges against a 
Border Patrol agent for lethal force in a few instances. Id. Similarly, the federal government has 
closed all but one investigation into deadly force by a Border Patrol agent without bringing charges. 
Id. The second-degree murder charges brought against Agent Lonnie Swartz are the sole exception. 
Id. A civil remedy is the legal or equitable means by which a court enforces a right or redresses a 
wrong. Civil Remedy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 7. The remedy most often takes the 
form of money damages or an injunction. Id. 
 14 Adam Liptak, An Agent Shot a Boy Across the U.S. Border. Can His Parents Sue?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/18/us/politics/an-agent-shot-a-boy-across-the-us-
border-can-his-parents-sue.html [https://perma.cc/7QCA-WJ8N] (discussing the deaths of the boys 
involved in both Rodriguez and Hernandez). 
 15 See Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 758 (Smith, J., dissenting) (noting the potential unequal administra-
tion of justice created by the circuit split). 
 16 See Hernandez, 885 F.3d 811, 823 (declining to extend a Bivens remedy in the context of a 
cross-border shooting). 
 17 See Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 748 (extending a Bivens remedy in the context of a cross-border 
shooting). 
 18 Monthly Argument Calendar November 2019, SUP. CT. U.S., (Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.
supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_calendars/MonthlyArgumentCalNovember2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KK8A-MEU7]. On February 25, 2020, as this Comment went to press, the Supreme 
Court decided Hernandez. See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text (discussing the ultimate hold-
ing in this case). 
 19 See infra notes 23–71 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 72–100 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 101–108 and accompanying text. 
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trated by federal law enforcement is deeply problematic, and that Congress 
should take action to provide a remedy in these circumstances.22 
I. LEGAL AND FACTUAL CONTEXT: THE BIVENS DOCTRINE AND THE FACTS 
OF HERNANDEZ V. MESA AND RODRIGUEZ V. SWARTZ 
Bivens remedies have gained increased attention in cases involving exces-
sive force perpetrated by federal law enforcement officials.23 It is within this 
highly political climate that a circuit split has emerged.24 Section A of this Part 
discusses the creation of the Bivens remedy and the evolving framework of the 
doctrine.25 Section B explains the modern approach to Bivens causes of ac-
tion.26 Finally, Section C introduces the facts and procedural histories of Her-
nandez v. Mesa and Rodriguez v. Swartz.27 
A. The Bivens Remedy: Implied Causes of Action 
A cause of action against federal actors who violate constitutional rights 
was created in 1971.28 In Bivens, the Supreme Court recognized an implied 
cause of action where a federal officer violated an individual’s constitutional 
rights.29 Specifically, the Court allowed the plaintiff to seek recovery of money 
damages as compensation for an alleged violation of his Fourth Amendment 
right against unreasonable search and seizure by a federal officer.30 In doing 
so, the Court recognized that federal officers acting on behalf of the United 
States government can cause greater injury than an individual acting without 
such authority.31 In what would become an important factor, the Court noted 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See infra notes 109–114 and accompanying text. 
 23 See Altholz, supra note 11, at 1, 5 (noting that although both civil and criminal actions against 
Border Patrol agents typically fail, public awareness of killings by agents is growing). Excessive force 
is defined as force that is unreasonable given the circumstances. Excessive Force, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY, supra note 7. 
 24 See Liptak, supra note 14 (discussing both Rodriguez and Hernandez, as well as the interna-
tional political landscape related to the cases). Compare Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 748 (extending a 
Bivens remedy in the context of a cross-border shooting), with Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 823 (declining 
to extend a Bivens remedy in the context of a cross-border shooting). 
 25 See infra notes 28–39 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 40–57 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 58–71 and accompanying text. 
 28 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1854; Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397. In Bivens, the petitioner alleged that Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics agents entered his apartment without a search warrant, arrested him, searched his 
apartment, and then took him to a courthouse where he was interrogated, booked, and strip searched. 403 
U.S. at 389. The petitioner claimed to have suffered “humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering” 
from the violation of his constitutional rights, and he sought monetary damages from the federal officials 
involved. Id. at 390. 
 31 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392. 
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that, in Bivens, there were no “special factors counselling hesitation” in ex-
tending a remedy where Congress had not expressly provided one.32 
Since Bivens, the Supreme Court has only extended an implied cause of 
action for constitutional violations in two other contexts.33 In 1979, in Davis v. 
Passman, the Court extended a Bivens remedy in an employment discrimina-
tion case.34 Then, in 1980, in Carlson v. Green, the Court further extended 
Bivens to apply where federal prison officials failed to treat a prisoner’s medi-
cal condition adequately.35 In the three decades since Davis and Carlson, how-
ever, the Court has refused to extend a Bivens cause of action to any new cate-
gories of defendants.36 The Court has expressly announced that Bivens claims 
are now “disfavored” and has adopted a more cautious approach in extending 
implied causes of action.37 The Court prefers for Congress to dictate reme-
dies.38 The Court’s reference in Bivens to “special factors counselling hesita-
tion” absent congressional action has become the central analytical question 
for courts deciding whether to extend a Bivens claim.39 
                                                                                                                           
 32 Id. at 396; see infra notes 45–54 and accompanying text (describing the “special factors” anal-
ysis). 
 33 See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1854–55 (noting that the Court has extended a Bivens remedy for sex-
based employment discrimination and inadequate medical care of a prisoner). 
 34 442 U.S. 228, 231, 248–49 (1979) (extending a Bivens cause of action under a theory of Fifth 
Amendment violation of due process where an employee claimed she was fired by a congressman on 
the basis of her sex). In this case, Congressman Otto Passman had hired Shirley Davis to serve as a 
deputy administrative assistant in his office. Id. at 230. Six months later, Passman fired Davis after 
concluding that the position needed to be filled by a man. Id. Davis sued the congressman, alleging 
that the discrimination on the basis of her sex violated her Fifth Amendment right to due process. Id. 
 35 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19, 24 (1980) (holding that a prisoner’s estate could recover 
damages under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment). Here, the 
respondent brought suit on behalf of her deceased son, Joseph Jones, Jr., who died while in federal 
prison. Id. at 16. The respondent alleged that the prison’s officials were aware the medical facilities 
were inadequate and of her son’s serious asthma. Id. at n.1. 
 36 See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1869 (declining to extend a Bivens cause of action to detainees held 
on suspicion of terrorist activity in the wake of the September 11 attacks); see, e.g., Minneci v. Pol-
lard, 565 U.S. 118, 120 (2012) (holding there was no Bivens cause of action for prisoners who claimed 
employees of a privately operated federal prison violated their Eighth Amendment rights); FDIC v. 
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 473 (1994) (declining to extend Bivens liability to an agency of the federal gov-
ernment); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 684 (1987) (holding there is no Bivens remedy 
available where injuries were incurred in the course of military service). 
 37 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (stating that Bivens claims are disfavored and 
emphasizing that the Court has been averse to extending implied causes of action to new contexts). 
 38 See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1855 (discussing the evolution of implied causes of action and the 
Court’s hesitation to imply either statutory or constitutional causes of action absent direction from 
Congress). 
 39 Id. at 1857; see Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 377–78 (1983) (holding that federal courts should 
consider “special factors counselling hesitation” before creating new federal causes of action without 
authorization from Congress); infra notes 48–54 and accompanying text (discussing the “special fac-
tors” analysis). 
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B. The Evolving Bivens Framework 
In the years after Bivens, an ill-defined, three-part approach evolved for 
evaluating whether to extend an implied cause of action for a constitutional 
violation by a federal official.40 As a threshold matter, courts determined (1) if 
a case presented a “new context” for granting a Bivens remedy.41 Then, courts 
evaluated (2) whether an alternative remedy existed.42 Lastly, courts consid-
ered (3) whether any “special factors counsel[ed] hesitation” in making an im-
plied cause of action available.43 Courts, however, struggled to identify and 
apply a workable framework for extending a Bivens remedy because the Su-
preme Court had declined to identify what represented a new context and what 
constituted a “special factor counselling hesitation.”44 
Then, in 2017, in Ziglar v. Abbasi, the Supreme Court clarified the analy-
sis for extending Bivens claims.45 Leaning heavily on separation of powers 
doctrine, the Court expressed a strong disinclination to extend Bivens, and em-
phasized that the creation of implied causes of action are a “disfavored” judi-
cial activity.46 The Court then seemingly adopted a new, two-prong approach 
                                                                                                                           
 40 See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1876 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting the ambiguity of the Court’s 
previous Bivens decisions and describing the three-step analytical approach to the extension of Bivens 
claims); Anya Bernstein, Congressional Will and the Role of the Executive in Bivens Actions: What Is 
Special About Special Factors?, 45 IND. L. REV. 719, 720 (2012) (noting the Supreme Court’s “ad 
hoc” development of the Bivens remedy). 
 41 Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 549 (2007); see infra notes 33–37 and accompanying text 
(describing the contexts previously recognized by the Court); see also Meshal v. Higgenbotham, 804 
F.3d 417, 423 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (noting that the court must first determine if a case would extend 
Bivens to a new context). 
 42 Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550. 
 43 Id.; see also Meshal, 804 F.3d at 425 (describing the three-step analytical framework for ex-
tending Bivens). 
 44 See, e.g., Meshal, 804 F.3d at 423 (noting that the Supreme Court had not defined “new con-
text” with regards to extending Bivens); Bernstein, supra note 40, at 720 (highlighting that Bivens 
jurisprudence has been developed on an ad hoc basis with special factors determined on a “case-by-
case” basis). Although the Court has not defined “special factors,” it has recognized that those factors 
have to do with whether the creation of a remedy should be left to Congress to decide, not whether a 
remedy is warranted. See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858 (recognizing there are areas where Congress has 
made its authority in a given area clear, such as matters relating to the military). 
 45 Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1869; see Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2007 (2017) (noting that 
the guidance the Court provided in Abbasi regarding the extension of Bivens claims was “interven-
ing”). In Ziglar v. Abbasi, suspects detained on suspicion of terrorism after the September 11, 2001, 
attacks alleged federal officials perpetrated Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations against them, 
including harsh pre-trial conditions and strip searches. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1853–54. The respondents 
sought damages through a Bivens claim against federal officials for the violation of their constitutional 
rights. Id. 
 46 Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675 (stating that Bivens claims are disfa-
vored). Separation of powers refers to the division of government authority into three branches of 
government: executive, legislative, and judicial. Separation of Powers, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 
supra note 7. In the three decades since Bivens, the Court has exercised much more caution, indicating 
that it is far preferable for Congress to explicitly provide for remedies. See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857 
(emphasizing there are a number of policy considerations for Congress to weigh before providing 
2020] Bivens Remedies for Federal Officer Cross-Border Shootings II.-25 
to the Bivens analysis.47 First, courts should determine whether a case presents 
a new context.48 If a case does so, courts should then engage in the “special 
factors analysis.”49 The Court emphasized the analysis should be focused on 
“who should decide” whether to imply a cause of action—the legislative or the 
judicial branch—rather than on whether a remedy is warranted.50 
Notably, in Abbasi, the Court clarified that a case presents a new context 
when it is “different in a meaningful way” from a previously identified Bivens 
claim.51 If a case represents a new context, a Bivens remedy may not be extend-
ed where “special factors couns[el] hesitation.”52 Although the Court did not 
define what constitutes a special factor, it did emphasize that the analysis should 
focus on whether the judiciary is the appropriate branch to weigh the costs and 
benefits of creating a new remedy.53 Thus, the underlying question is whether it 
is proper for the Court to imply a cause of action when Congress is silent.54 
As it stands today, if a case presents a new context for the extension of a 
Bivens remedy, courts must proceed with broad deference to Congress by en-
gaging in an analysis to identify if any “special factors counselling hesitation” 
exist.55 In the wake of Abbasi, a circuit split emerged, in which the Fifth Cir-
cuit declined to extend a Bivens remedy for an extraterritorial killing by a 
United States Border Patrol agent, but the Ninth Circuit extended the remedy 
                                                                                                                           
remedies against federal government officials, and therefore, the Court should proceed cautiously in 
creating remedies of its own). The Court went so far as to say that “it is possible that the analysis in 
the Court’s three Bivens cases might have been different if they were decided today.” Id. at 1856. The 
Court, however, stopped short of overruling any of those cases and expressly affirmed Bivens in its 
original Fourth Amendment search and seizure context. Id. at 1856–57. 
 47 Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857–58; see Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 816 (describing the “two-part” 
analysis of Bivens claims after Abbasi). 
 48 Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858. In Abbasi, the Court opined that the court of appeals should have 
found that the case represented a new context prior to analyzing the presence of special factors. Id. at 
1860. 
 49 Id.; see Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 818 (analyzing special factors after determining that the case in 
question represented a new Bivens context). In Abbasi, the Court de-emphasized the existence of al-
ternative remedies as a formal step in the analysis, and instead considered the presence of alternatives 
in its analysis of special factors. 137 S. Ct. at 1858. 
 50 Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857. 
 51 Id. at 1859. The Court further explained that meaningful differences can include the federal 
officials involved, the constitutional right, the risk of judicial overreach, or “other special factors.” Id. 
 52 Id. at 1858 (explaining that the Court must not create a remedy where there are “sound rea-
sons” Congress may doubt its necessity). 
 53 Id. at 1857–58. 
 54 See id. (holding that “separation-of-powers principles are or should be central to the analysis”). 
In Abbasi, the Court provided examples of factors that may “counsel hesitation,” including issues that 
are ordinarily in the purview of the legislative or executive branches, such as national security. Id. at 
1861. 
 55 Id. at 1857. 
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under those circumstances.56 The Supreme Court took up the issue in its 2019–
2020 term.57 
C. Factual and Procedural Histories of Hernandez v. Mesa  
and Rodriguez v. Swartz 
Two recent cases involving lethal shootings by Border Patrol agents have 
tested the limits of Bivens claims.58 On June 7, 2010, Sergio Hernandez, a fif-
teen-year-old Mexican citizen, was killed by Border Patrol Agent Jesus Mesa 
after the agent shot across the international boundary.59 Hernandez’s parents 
brought a Bivens claim against Agent Mesa, claiming that he violated their 
son’s Fifth Amendment right to substantive due process.60 The United States 
District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed the Bivens claim, but 
was reversed by a panel of the Fifth Circuit.61 The Fifth Circuit reheard the 
appeal en banc and, without addressing the Bivens claim, unanimously held 
Agent Mesa was protected by qualified immunity against a Fifth Amendment 
claim.62 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2016 to hear Her-
nandez in conjunction with Abbasi.63 After deciding Abbasi, the Court re-
manded Hernandez to the Fifth Circuit and instructed that the availability of a 
                                                                                                                           
 56 Compare Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 748 (extending a Bivens remedy where a Border Patrol agent 
shot across the United States/Mexico border, killing a Mexican citizen), with Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 
823 (declining to extend a Bivens remedy where a Border Patrol agent killed a Mexican citizen by 
firing his weapon across the southwestern border). 
 57 See Hernandez v. Mesa, 139 S. Ct. 2636 (2019) (granting certiorari). As this Comment went to 
press, the Supreme Court decided Hernandez v. Mesa and affirmed the Fifth Circuit. See supra notes 
1–7 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s decision to decline a Bivens remedy in the context 
of a cross-border shooting). 
 58 Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 748; Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 823. 
 59 Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 814. According to the pleadings, Hernandez was near a culvert that 
separates Ciudad Juárez, Mexico and El Paso, Texas when a group of young men in Mexico began 
throwing rocks at the law enforcement officers in the United States. Id. It is unclear whether Hernan-
dez was also throwing rocks, but the teenager did run from the agents. See Liptak, supra note 14 (de-
scribing the conflicting accounts of Hernandez’s actions in the moments before he was killed). Agent 
Mesa fired his weapon toward the young men, killing Hernandez. Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 814. 
 60 Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 814. 
 61 Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 277 (5th Cir. 2014); Hernandez v. United States, 
802 F. Supp. 2d 834, 837 (W.D. Tex. 2011). 
 62 Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 277. The Fifth Circuit did not consider whether a Bivens remedy would 
be available because it did not find a constitutional violation. Id. Qualified immunity protects public 
officials from civil liability for damages related to their employment as long as their “conduct does not 
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights . . . .” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 
818 (1982). The Court applies an objective reasonableness standard to the public official’s conduct to 
determine whether it violates a clearly established right. Id.; see also Amanda Peters, Mass Arrests & 
the Particularized Probable Cause Requirement, 60 B.C. L. REV. 217, 241 (2019) (explaining that the 
objective reasonableness standard provides law enforcement “fair notice” that they may be sued for 
illegal conduct). 
 63 Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 814. 
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Bivens claim should be analyzed before the merits of the constitutional 
claims.64 On remand, following the Court’s analysis in Abbasi, the Fifth Cir-
cuit declined to extend a Bivens remedy to the new context of a cross-border 
shooting.65 
Two years after Hernandez was killed, on October 10, 2012, J.A., a six-
teen-year-old boy who was on the Mexican side of the border, was shot and 
killed by Border Patrol Agent Lonnie Swartz.66 In a similar Bivens cause of 
action, J.A.’s mother claimed Swartz violated her son’s Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment rights.67 Swartz argued that he was entitled to qualified immunity 
and that the court should dismiss the claim.68 On July 9, 2015, the United 
States District Court for the District of Arizona held that Swartz was not enti-
tled to qualified immunity and treated the shooting as a seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment.69 Swartz then filed an interlocutory appeal arguing that 
the district court erred in its denial of qualified immunity.70 Splitting from the 
Fifth Circuit, in August 2018, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
decision in Rodriguez to extend Bivens to the new context of a cross-border 
shooting.71 
II. LEGAL CONTEXT AND FRAMEWORK 
Together, Hernandez v. Mesa and Rodriguez v. Swartz represent two of 
the most high-profile incidents of alleged excessive force by Border Patrol 
agents in the last decade.72 The cases have created a divide among two of the 
                                                                                                                           
 64 See Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2006 (noting that the Bivens question is “antecedent” to the con-
stitutional issues in the case). 
 65 Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 823. 
 66 Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 727. As Rodriguez came before the Ninth Circuit on an interlocutory 
appeal, the facts were taken as pleaded and assumed to be true for the court’s analysis. Id. at 727–28. 
According to the pleadings, J.A. was walking along the Calle Internacional in Nogales, Mexico when 
on-duty Border Patrol Agent Lonnie Swartz, who was standing in the United States, fired between 
fourteen and thirty bullets through a border fence. Id. at 727. Swartz struck J.A. with approximately 
ten bullets. Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id.  
 69 Rodriguez v. Swartz, 111 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1040 (D. Ariz. 2015) (holding that a reasonable 
person would know killing another person without justification violated a constitutional right). Be-
cause the shooting was treated as a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment due 
process claim was dismissed. Id.  at 1038; see Graham v. O’Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (hold-
ing that “seizures” in the context of excessive force by law enforcement are best analyzed under the 
Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard and do not raise a substantive due process 
issue). 
 70 Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 728. An interlocutory appeal allows a party to challenge a legal matter 
in the case before a final ruling is issued. Interlocutory Appeal, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra 
note 7. 
 71 Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 748; Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 823; see infra notes 89–100 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s decision). 
 72 Liptak, supra note 14 (discussing both Rodriguez and Hernandez). 
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circuits touching the southern border of the United States.73 Section A of this 
Part explains the Fifth Circuit’s approach in Hernandez to the Bivens special 
factors analysis required for a case presenting a new Bivens context.74 Section 
B analyzes the differing approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in Rodriguez, and 
highlights the split between the circuits.75 
A. The Fifth Circuit’s Application of the Abbasi Special Factors Analysis 
In 2017, the Supreme Court decided Ziglar v. Abbasi and provided a clari-
fied framework for adjudicating future Bivens claims.76 Specifically, the Court 
held that where a case presents an extension of the Bivens remedy to a new 
context, courts should consider whether any special factors indicate that the 
extension of a remedy should be left to Congress.77 On the same day, the Court 
remanded Hernandez to the Fifth Circuit to consider the merits of extending a 
Bivens claim to a cross-border shooting using the “intervening” guidance set 
forth in Abbasi.78 
In 2018, upon remand, the Fifth Circuit in Hernandez examined the key 
threshold question set forth in Abbasi: does the case present meaningfully dif-
ferent circumstances from existing Bivens cases?79 The Fifth Circuit affirma-
tively answered this question, concluding that a fatal shooting of a foreign citi-
zen across an international border presented a new context under Bivens.80 The 
court noted that because the extension of Bivens is generally disfavored, and 
that this case would represent an extraordinary extension, the new context it-
                                                                                                                           
 73 Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 758 (9th Cir. 2018) (Smith, J., dissenting). The Ninth Cir-
cuit’s southwestern border states include California and Arizona, and the Fifth Circuit includes Texas. 
Id. On February 25, 2020, as this Comment went to press, the Supreme Court decided Hernandez v. 
Mesa and resolved the circuit split. See infra notes 1–7 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s 
holding in Hernandez). 
 74 See infra notes 76–88 and accompanying text. 
 75 See infra notes 89–100 and accompanying text. 
 76 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1869 (2017); see Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2007 
(2017) (noting that the Court had clarified the special factors analysis in Ziglar v. Abbasi). 
 77 Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857. 
 78 See Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811, 814 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. granted in part, 139 S. Ct. 
2636 (2019) (noting that after the Supreme Court declined to extend a Bivens claim to the respondents 
in Abbasi, the Court remanded Hernandez to be considered); see also Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2007 
(characterizing the Court’s guidance in Abbasi as “intervening”). 
 79 See Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 816 (beginning its Bivens analysis by considering if the case repre-
sented a new context); see also Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1859–60 (explaining that a case represents an 
extension of Bivens where it differs meaningfully from previous claims recognized by the Court). 
Meaningful differences can include, for example, the rank of the federal official or the constitutional 
right at issue. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1859. 
 80 Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 816 (noting that if Abbasi represented a “new context” even in light of 
similarities to other Bivens cases related to strip searches and prison abuses, then a fatal international 
shooting must also meet the meaningful difference standard). The Court previously indicated that 
“even a modest extension [of Bivens] is still an extension” that warrants a special factors analysis. 
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1864. 
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self warranted declining to extend a remedy.81 The Fifth Circuit, however, opt-
ed to proceed with the analysis and consider whether any “special factors 
counsel[ed] hesitation” in extending Bivens to this new context.82 
Following the framework set forth in Abbasi, the Fifth Circuit recognized 
that to determine whether the judiciary should extend a cause of action, legisla-
tive primacy is at the heart of the special factors analysis.83 In Hernandez, the 
court identified the presence of several special factors that caused hesitation in 
extending Bivens to a cross-border shooting.84 First, the Fifth Circuit recog-
nized national security and potential interference with foreign diplomacy as 
special factors that are generally within the purview of legislative and execu-
tive branches of government.85 Next, the court reasoned that Congress’s failure 
to provide a remedy may have been intentional.86 Most importantly, the Fifth 
Circuit emphasized the extraterritorial nature of the case as a special factor that 
should give the judiciary great pause before extending a Bivens claim.87 Hold-
ing that the special factors present in Hernandez required careful consideration 
and balance, the Fifth Circuit confidently declined to extend a Bivens remedy 
in the novel context of an extraterritorial shooting by a federal officer standing 
in the United States.88 
B. The Ninth Circuit’s “Highly Specific” Approach to the  
Special Factors Analysis 
In 2018, after the Fifth Circuit decided Hernandez, the Ninth Circuit con-
fronted the same question of whether to extend a Bivens remedy for an extra-
                                                                                                                           
 81 Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 818. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id.; see also Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857 (holding that when an issue involves a number of con-
siderations that must be balanced, it is better for Congress, rather than the Courts, to act). 
 84 Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 817. 
 85 Id. at 818–19. The Fifth Circuit highlighted that it may be inappropriate for judicial involve-
ment where U.S. officials had declined to extradite Agent Mesa to Mexico, and the two nations were 
in ongoing discussions about the case. Id. at 820. 
 86 Id. at 820 (comparing Bivens with 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which limits damage remedies to citizens 
or persons in the jurisdiction of the United States). 
 87 Id. at 821. The Fifth Circuit also noted that the Supreme Court has never recognized a non-
statutory cause of action for extraterritorial conduct. Id. at 822. The D.C. Circuit has also found that 
extraterritoriality is a special factor that cautions judicial restraint as it relates to a Bivens claim for an 
injury occurring in a foreign country. Meshal v. Higgenbotham, 804 F.3d 417, 425–26 (D.C. Cir. 
2015). In Meshal v. Higgenbotham, the petitioner filed a Bivens action against Federal Bureau of 
Investigation agents who allegedly tortured him over a period of months in three African countries. Id. 
at 418. The court held that a Bivens action could not be extended where the conduct in question took 
place overseas in the context of a terrorism investigation. Id. 
 88 Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 823 (holding that the standard for a special factors analysis is low and 
the considerations involved with an extraterritorial application of Bivens are appropriately left to the 
legislative branch of government). 
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territorial killing by a Border Patrol agent.89 Following the guidance set forth 
in Abbasi, the Ninth Circuit also readily concluded that applying Bivens to a 
foreign national shot in a foreign country would extend Bivens to a new con-
text.90 The court then returned to the pre-Abbasi approach to extending a 
Bivens claim by considering the existence of alternative remedies before turn-
ing to the special factors analysis.91 
Finally, the court analyzed if any special factors existed to determine 
whether a Bivens remedy should be extended.92 Noting that the Court’s ap-
proach in extending Bivens has examined new contexts on a case-by-case ba-
sis, the Ninth Circuit inferred that the special factors analysis should be con-
ducted through a highly specific lens.93 Thus, the circuit court proceeded by 
analyzing the facts specific to Rodriguez, rather than “cross-border shootings 
generally.”94 
In its analysis, the circuit court carefully distinguished the facts of Rodri-
guez from those in Abbasi.95 Finding that the claim in Rodriguez was directed 
at an individual officer, rather than the leadership of an executive agency, the 
court determined there was no special factor present related to existing gov-
ernment policy.96 Next, the court dismissed the notion that holding a Border 
Patrol agent civilly liable for an unjustified murder would implicate national 
security concerns.97 The Ninth Circuit also found that foreign policy implica-
tions were not a “special factor counseling hesitation” in extending Bivens in 
this specific case and noted that the United States had not identified a specific 
foreign policy that could be affected.98 Finally, the Ninth Circuit was uncon-
cerned by the extraterritorial nature of a cross-border shooting and declined to 
                                                                                                                           
 89 Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 726; Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 811. 
 90 Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 738. 
 91 See id. at 738–39 (analyzing alternative remedies separately from the presence of special fac-
tors and holding that Rodriguez had no alternative outside of a Bivens claim); see also Wilkie v. Rob-
bins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007) (illustrating the pre-Abbasi approach to Bivens claims by explaining 
that alternative remedies should be considered before any special factors). 
 92 Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 744. 
 93 See id. (noting that in Abbasi, the Court examined post-September 11 detention polices, not 
“prison polices generally”). 
 94 See id. (stating that the special factors analysis should be applied to the specific facts of the 
case, which the court characterized as an “unjustifiable and intentional” murder). 
 95 See id. at 745 (noting that unlike the plaintiffs in Abbasi, the plaintiff in Rodriguez v. Mesa 
sued an individual federal agent rather than a high-level government official, and that the claim of 
murder in Rodriguez did not contradict government policy). 
 96 Id.; see also FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994) (noting that the purpose of Bivens is to 
deter individual officers from committing constitutional violations). 
 97 See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1862 (holding that “national-security concerns must not become a 
talisman used to ward off inconvenient claims”); Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 745–46 (noting that the na-
tional security concerns do not apply where law enforcement commits an unjustified killing). 
 98 Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 745–46. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that not extending a Bivens 
remedy would threaten the United States’ relationship with Mexico. Id. 
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find that aspect of the case a special factor that should “couns[el] hesitation” by 
the court.99 As a result, splitting from the Fifth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit extend-
ed a Bivens cause of action to the new context of a cross-border shooting.100 
III. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE BIVENS  
FRAMEWORK SET FORTH IN ABBASI 
The Ninth Circuit erred in Rodriguez v. Swartz by returning to the pre-
Abbasi approach to extending Bivens remedies and failing to adequately con-
sider the role of the legislature in its analysis.101 The Ninth Circuit rejected the 
legitimate concerns of extending Bivens to an extraterritorial context because 
the agent was standing in the United States.102 With the far-reaching policy 
implications of creating an implied cause of action for a shooting that occurs 
across a highly politicized border, however, extraterritoriality is precisely the 
type of special factor the Court has emphasized should be weighed by Con-
gress, rather than the courts.103 
Although there may be some merit to the Ninth Circuit’s highly specific 
approach, the court’s analysis fails when the foreign policy implications pre-
sent in Rodriguez are considered.104 The United States was in ongoing discus-
sions with Mexico about the cross-border shooting and cautioned that an ex-
tension of Bivens could hinder its diplomatic goals.105 This fact alone should 
                                                                                                                           
 99 See id. at 747 (holding that a presumption against extending Bivens to an extraterritorial con-
text is rebutted by the fact that Agent Swartz was standing on United States territory when he fired his 
weapon). 
 100 Id. at 748; Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 823. 
 101 See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857–58 (2017) (holding that “separation-of-powers 
principles are or should be central to the analysis”); Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d at 719, 738–39 
(9th Cir. 2018) (analyzing the existence of alternative remedies prior to the special factors analysis); 
Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 749 (Smith, J., dissenting) (noting that the Ninth Circuit majority ignored 
precedent and intruded on legislative primacy). 
 102 See Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 747 (holding that the presumption against extraterritoriality is 
rebutted by the fact that Agent Swartz’s conduct took place in the United States, even if Rodriguez 
was standing in Mexico). But see Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013) 
(emphasizing the difficulty in overcoming the presumption against extraterritoriality even where the 
facts involve activity in the United States). 
 103 See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857 (holding that issues requiring the balancing of competing con-
siderations should be entrusted to Congress); Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 756 (Smith, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that extraterritoriality is a “critical” special factor); see also Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 116 (“The pre-
sumption against extraterritorial application helps ensure that the Judiciary does not erroneously adopt 
an interpretation of U.S. law that carries foreign policy consequences not clearly intended by the polit-
ical branches”); Meshal v. Higgenbotham, 804 F.3d 417, 430 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh, J., con-
curring) (stating that because there is a presumption against applying statutes extraterritorially, it 
would be “grossly anomalous” to apply Bivens in an extraterritorial context). 
 104 See Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 754 (Smith, J., dissenting) (noting that Mexico and the United 
States were engaging in active diplomacy about cross-border shootings). 
 105 Id. at 746, 754. 
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have caused the court to hesitate, because its action would directly implicate 
foreign diplomacy related to the specific case at hand.106 
The Fifth Circuit, in Hernandez v. Mesa, correctly applied the special fac-
tors analysis envisioned by the Supreme Court by emphasizing legislative pri-
macy in its decision.107 Given the current state of Bivens jurisprudence, the 
Court will likely affirm the ruling in Hernandez, declining to extend Bivens to 
the new context of an extraterritorial shooting of a non-citizen when it decides 
the issue during its 2019–2020 term.108 
Although the Fifth Circuit correctly applied the Supreme Court’s Bivens 
jurisprudence, scholars have argued that declining to extend a Bivens remedy 
for an extraterritorial shooting will create a dangerous loophole where federal 
law enforcement officials will face no consequences for extraterritorial kill-
ings.109 The perception of a “no-man’s land” not only damages the United 
States’ relationship with Mexico, but is also antithetical to the reality that, very 
often, border residents consider their communities bi-national.110 
It cannot be understated that the Supreme Court’s analysis in Bivens cases 
does not center on whether a remedy is deserved or appropriate, but rather, 
“who should decide” to create a remedy—”Congress or the courts?”111 Alt-
                                                                                                                           
 106 See id. (highlighting that the ongoing diplomacy between Mexico and the United States 
“counsels hesitation”); see also Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811, 819 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. granted 
in part, 139 S. Ct. 2636 (2019) (concluding that the extension of Bivens in the context of a cross-
border shooting would affect diplomacy between the two nations). The United States cautioned in 
Rodriguez v. Swartz that extending a Bivens claim would “under[mine] the government’s ability to 
speak with one voice in international affairs.” Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 746. 
 107 See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857 (holding that, most often, it should be Congress that decides 
whether to extend a remedy); Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 823 (holding that the special factors present in 
the case require deference to the legislature). 
 108 See Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 822 (highlighting the “presumption against extraterritoriality” in 
extending rights to non-citizens whose rights are violated abroad); Fallon, supra note 7, at 957 (noting 
that the Roberts Court has been conservative in expanding governmental liability and strongly disin-
clined toward extending Bivens actions); Monthly Argument Calendar November 2019, supra note 18. 
As this Comment went to press, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit in its decision not to 
extend a Bivens remedy in Hernandez v. Mesa. See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the holding in Hernandez). 
 109 See Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 823 (holding that the special factors present in the case require 
deference to the legislature); Altholz, supra note 11, at 39 (concluding that the ruling in Hernandez 
may create a legal exemption for extraterritorial shootings). 
 110 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 291 (2016) (No. 15-
118) (characterizing the Fifth Circuit’s decision not to extend a Bivens remedy as creating a “law-free 
zone” for Border Patrol agents); Alexandra A. Botsaris, Note, Hernandez v. Mesa: Preserving the 
Zone of Constitutional Uncertainty at the Border, 77 MD. L. REV. 832, 852 (2018) (describing the 
characteristics of El Paso, Texas and Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, a southwestern border community where 
residents share cultural celebrations and regularly cross the border for work and school); Liptak, supra 
note 14 (noting that Mexico has asked the Supreme Court to apply U.S. constitutional law in Hernan-
dez to address the issue of border shootings). 
 111 Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857 (indicating that the focus of a special factors analysis should turn on 
whether it is preferable for Congress to extend a remedy, and that in most cases the legislative branch 
is best suited to make this decision). 
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hough the Supreme Court will likely affirm the Fifth Circuit’s approach to the 
special factors analysis, the underlying circumstances of these twin cases war-
rant immediate legislative action.112 Congress, therefore, should ensure that 
federal agents are held accountable in the unique context of an extraterritorial 
shooting at one of the nation’s international boundaries.113 After all, that is ex-
actly the division of responsibilities envisioned by the Court.114 
CONCLUSION 
In 2018, the Fifth Circuit correctly decided Hernandez v. Mesa by declin-
ing to extend a Bivens remedy to the new context of an extraterritorial shoot-
ing. After conducting a special factors analysis, the court rightly concluded that 
creating a cause of action for damages should be left to Congress. On similar 
facts, the Ninth Circuit erred in 2018, in Rodriguez v. Swartz, by ignoring the 
Court’s recent Bivens guidance set forth in Ziglar v. Abbasi. When the Su-
preme Court considers Hernandez in its 2019–2020 term, it is likely to uphold 
the Fifth Circuit’s approach to the special factors analysis that emphasized leg-
islative primacy in its decision not to extend a Bivens claim. Congress, howev-
er, should act immediately to address civil liability in the context of extraterri-
torial excessive force by federal agents at the United States border. 
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